INTRODUCTION
It has been a great many years since the United States has been viewed as a pirate nation. Today, the United States seems to be the number one finger pointer, but certainly not usually characterized as an infringer itself. However, in the case of geographical indications, the United States is out of step with international standards. In this article, with geographical indications. In this regard, the United States is much like other countries that are not in complete compliance with TRIPs due to a lack of self-interest. But unlike other countries who may not yet be in complete compliance with TRIPs because the various intellectual property regimes may be new to them, the United States, I argue, has failed to fully comply because of its distinct history and theoretical perspective concerning geographical indications.
II. RATIONALE FOR THE PROTECTION OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS
It should not be surprising that the United States is not a major proponent of the protection of geographical indications? Countries that stand to benefit the most from the protection of geographical indications are those that have a long history of traditional industries, such as many European countries.
3 These historical differences may help explain the stance that the United States has taken with regard to the protection of geographical indications, as compared to its stance towards other intellectual property rights negotiated in TRIPs Agreement. 4 At least in the case of trademarks, it is not overly simplistic or inaccurate to say that the United States, with the exception of protections of geographical indications, took a strongly pro protectionist, pro-property position in these negotiations. 5 That is, in most cases it pushed for an expansion or ratcheting up of trademark Agreement (1996) ; Agreement, supra n. I, at 1203-05 (discussing the protection of trademarks); "[BJut the United States-otherwise a supporter of strong intellectual property rights protection-was not willing to go too far, especially with regard to protection of wines and spirits." Kunstadt & Buhler, supra n. I, at C3. rights. In contrast, the United States was resistant to adopt the protections of geographical indications urged by some countries, such as France in particular. 6 The inability of the U.S. to benefit to the same extent as European countries, because of its apparent dearth of traditional industries, does not fully explain U.S. resistance to the protection of geographical indications.? Instead, I submit, the discord is of a more fundamental nature having to do with the basic approach each continent takes to trademark law. Since the earliest days in Europe, geographical indications were used to protect certain industries. As local reputations grew for certain products, use of the place names became attractive. To some extent such markings served as a warranty for the quality of the goods. To ensure the locale's reputation, the local industry would agree to certain standards of production. The granting of a right to use a geographical term associated with particular goods exclusively to the producers within a certain region served to limit competition, especially from producers outside that region.
9
This purpose is in contrast with the theory behind the prohibition of uses of false indications of origin in the United States, under the 6. In fact, the United States' resistance to agree on this point held up all of the WTO/GATT Agreements. W. Lee Webster, The Impact ofNAFTA, GATT Lanham Act. 1O In the U.S., such use is prohibited not to protect an industry, but to protect the consumer against any resulting deception. II In the U.S., generally speaking, there are no rights in a tenn or sign until that tenn or sign has become distinctive in the minds of the relevant consumer as an indicator of source.12 Thus, we are reluctant to view these types of tenns as conveying any kind of property rights in and of themselves before they have been invested with meaning resulting from use in commerce. 13 The example of Budweiser beer illustrates these different approaches. In the U.S., we recognize a property right in the tenn "Budweiser" because it has been used in such a manner so as to have a particular meaning for U.S. beer drinkers-as a source identifier.
14 The tenn, however, was not free of meaning when the Anheuser-Busch Company adopted it as a trademark. 15 In fact, "Budweiser" beer has been brewed in Ceske Budejovice, Bohemia, known as "Budweis" in German, for over 700 years.16 Thus, the term "Budweiser" could have been seen as a geographical indication that was deserving of protection by reason of its association with beer production, and hence off limits to beer not produced in that region. But as most U.S. beer drinkers did not make this association at the time of its introduction, it was allowed to be used in a manner that would invest it with a different meaning that ofa brand of U.S. produced beer. 17 Drawing from this example, it is apparent that U.S. trademark law is primarily concerned with the protection of consumers from the confusing use of terms in branding. 18 Had U.S. beer drinkers been aware of the town in Bohemia, and thought that it was desirable for beer to originate in that town, Anheuser-Busch would likely not have been free to appropriate that term for its brand. To do so would have confused consumers as to the origin of its product. However, for a country that is more concerned with protecting a traditional industry, such as breweries, the analysis would not begin and end with the consumer; but rather, would take into account the harm that might befall that industry should its geographical name be freely appropriated by outside competitors. This latter theory of protection encourages those industries to maintain high standards of quality in order to benefit from such a rights scheme. And when they do, they have the right to prevent uses of the term that would diminish that local reputation.
III THE TRIPS COMPROMISE
Coming from such different positions in terms of the benefits to their domestic economies resulting from protection as well as fundamentally different theories of protection, it is no surprise that what was agreed to regarding geographical indications in the TRIPs Agreement was a classic compromise.
19 Part II, Section 3 of TRIPs [I]ndications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin?'
The Agreement requires Members to provide the legal means to "interested parties,,22 to prevent the use of a geographical indication that suggests that the good originates from a place other than its true place of origin in a manner that is misleading. 23 Article 23 of TRIPs arguably provides stronger protection than does article 22 for geographical indications used in connection with wines and spirits.z 4 Here, Members are required to provide interested parties with the legal means to prevent the use of a geographical indication for a wine or spirit not originating in the place indicated by the geographical indication. 25 Unlike article 22, this article does not require that the use of the geographical indication be misleading in order to be actionable.
26 Furthermore, use of a false geographical indication for wines and spirits will be prohibited even where the true place of origin is indicated or where it is accompanied by terms such as "kind," "type," or "style.,,27 In short, a consumer's reaction to the use of the geographical indication is irrelevant. These rights, however, are seriously qualified by certain exceptions that follow in article 24.28 First, Members are not required to forbid the continued and similar use of a false geographical indication of another Member on wines and spirits by any of its "nationals or domiciliaries," who have used the term continuously in the Member territory either "for at least 1 0 years preceding 15 April As a result of TRIPs, the U.S. amended its law with regard to the protection of geographical indications, but not nearly to the extent required by the Agreement. 32 Prior to TRIPs, the Lanham Act prohibited the registration of "deceptive" marks 33 and marks that were "primarily geographically descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive.,,34 Additionally, a right of action existed against use of a mark that was likely to cause confusion or to deceive. 35 Congress saw fit to amend these provisions prior to TRIPs in order to implement the protections for geographical indications contained in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).36 Specifically, section 2(e) ofthe Lanham Act, which prohibited the registration of terms that were primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive, was amended to include a grandfather clause for such terms that had become distinctive before December 8, 1993,37
After TRIPs, Congress made only one change to the Lanham Act to implement the Agreement. 38 A clause was added to section 2(a) specifically prohibiting the use of a geographical indication, which when used in connection with wines or spirits, identifies a place other than the origin of the goods,39 This clause also contains a grandfather clause, which allows such a use if it commenced before January 1, 1996. 40 Beyond that single amendment, Congress pronounced that the activities of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) ensures compliance.
In fact, the BATF indirectly figures into U.S. compliance with international protections for geographical indications by regulating the labeling of alcoholic beverages in the U.S. 41 These regulations prohibit false or misleading claims in the labeling or advertising of alcoholic beverages, and require the prior approval of all labels used on alcoholic beverages. 42 More specifically, since 1960, in an effort to determine whether a geographic term is misleading, the BATF has categorized geographical indications as generic, semi-generic, and non-generic. 43 Generic terms may be used freely and do not require the local origin to 37. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e), (t) (Supp. V 1988) . Another minor change was to separate section 2( e) into two clauses: one forbidding the registration of a term that, when used, is primarily geographically descriptive; and another forbidding terms that are primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive. Id. Under the TRIPs standard, use of "Bombay" may tend to suggest that the origin of the watches is Bombay, which may be misleading. That is, since Bombay is not a generic term for watches, and since it does not indicate a brand before it acquires secondary meaning, reasonable consumers may think that the presence of the term indicates the place of origin. Thus, under the TRIPs approach the use would be enjoined. 55 However, under the U.s. approach, one would need to determine whether consumers of watches in the U.S. would likely perceive an association between watches and Bombay.56 That is, if Bombay is noted for its watch industry, or if reasonable consumers would be motivated to purchase a watch, because they thought it came from Bombay, then we may conclude that such an association exists. Since neither happens to be the case, I am doubtful that a goods-place association will be found, and the use would likely be permitted in the U.S.
A third key difference is the standing requirements. 57 TRIPs requires Members to provide the legal means to prevent the use of a false geographical indication to all "interested parties."ss In contrast, U.S. trademark law only grants standing to persons who are "likely to 53 be damaged.,,59 This standard has been judicially defined as "the potential for a commercial or competitive injury" in the U.S. 60 This potential injury will not be presumed, but must be demonstrated, and the plaintiff must be able to show a causal nexus between such harm and defendant's actions.
6J
Although "interested parties" are not defmed in TRIPs, an interested party may be understood as a competitor, or as one who produces the goods in question in the place indicated by the geographical indication. U.S. trademark law, however, is far more exacting. In the U.S., courts have "limited standing to assert a section 43 [of the Lanham Act] claim to a 'purely commercial class' of plaintiffs," or otherwise stated, to those engaged in commerce. 62 Another important difference is that TRIPs mandates the prohibition of the registration and use of false geographical indications. 63 Significantly, the Lanham Act only prohibits the registration of such terms. 64 No provision was added in the TRIPs implementing legislation for "interested parties" to prevent the use of a false geographical indication. 65 The only avenue of redress available is a claim under section 43(a) for a person who is "likely to be damaged" by the use of a term that is "likely to cause confusion, or to cause
,,66 mIst e, or to ecelve .... When comparing TRIPs to the BA TF standards, an obvious difference is the BATF's creation of the "semi-generic" category. 67 TRIPs, of course, prohibits false geographical indications used in connection with wines or spirits, even where the true origin of the [Vol. 22 goods is indicated. 68 Additionally, under TRIPs, there is an exception where the term has become generic, but there is no exception for terms that have become semi-generic. 69 Article 24 of TRIPs states in part:
Nothing in this Section shall require a Member to apply its provisions in respect of a geographical indication of any other Member with respect to goods or services for which the relevant indication is identical with the term customary in common language as the common name for such goods or services in the territory of that Member. Nothing in this Section shall require a Member to apply its provisions in respect of a geographical indication of any other Member with respect to products of the vine for which the relevant indication is identical with the customary name of a grape variety existing in the territory of that Member as of the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement.70
The term "semi-generic" is in fact new to the trademark lexicon. The only guidance we are given as to what the term "semi-generic" could possibly mean is through the examples provided by the BATF, which include: Burgundy; Claret; Chablis; Champagne; Chianti; and Sauteme. However, the plaintiffs were legally prohibited from selling their Havana rum in the U.S. because of the existing U.S. embargo against Cuba. 77 The defendants, Bacardi Corporation et aI., wanted to establish rights to sell rum in the U.S. under the same mark, "Havana Club.,,78 Again, because of the embargo against Cuba, the defendants were legally prohibited from selling in the U.S. a rum produced in Cuba.
79
This case may appear straightforward under TRIPs. "Havana Club" for rum would likely be considered a geographical indication in that Cuba is a place well known and regarded for its rum production. Further, the plaintiffs would likely be considered "interested parties," being the producer of the goods in the place indicated by the geographical indication. 81 Under article 22 of TRIPs, use of "Havana Club" on rum would tend to suggest that the rum came from Havana and would likely mislead consumers. 82 Moreover, because a spirit is concerned, article 23 is applicable. Under article 23, regardless of whether the mark "Havana Club" would mislead consumers, defendants' use would be actionable because defendants' rum was simply not from Cuba. 83 Additionally, defendants do not qualify for any exception, as they did not begin to use the mark until 1995. 84 Furthermore, the defendants' use of the mark was not in good faith as they knew of the plaintiffs' production of rum under the "Havana Club" label and the significance of that label in the rum market. First, and most significantly, the court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing. 88 The plaintiffs were forced to sue under section 43(a) because this was a case in which the use of a false geographical indication was at issue, as opposed to its registration. 89 However, the plaintiffs were not commercially damaged in the United States by the defendants' actions, because the embargo legally prohibited the plaintiffs from selling their rum in the United States. 90 That is, the defendants' wrongful conduct could not possibly cause the plaintiffs to lose a single sale in the u.S.
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The argument that they would be irreparably damaged when the embargo is lifted was rejected on the grounds that the damage was too speculative, since it is not certain when, if ever, the forty-year-old embargo will cease.92
The embargo may have posed additional problems for plaintiffs had they survived the standing requirement. 43(a), the plaintiffs would have to prove that consumers would likely be confused into believing that the defendants' rum was from Cuba;94 unlike section 2(e)(3), where the plaintiffs could certainly make a showing of a goods-place association between rum and Cuba. 95 Moreover, as rum from Cuba has been legally prevented from appearing on liquor store shelves for the past forty years, one can imagine a scenario in which the defendants could make a showing that U.S. consumers seeing a rum product for sale in the U.S. marked "Havana Club," would know that it could not possibly be from Cuba. 96
VII. CONCLUSION The Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A. case is merely the most recent illustration of the disconnect between the United States' rationale for protecting geographical indications, and the rationale that other countries have for this type of protection. The Scotch Whisky Association has filed numerous and unsuccessful cases in U.S. courts in attempts to prevent the use of words and symbols that it believed suggested Scotland as the place of origin for many Whiskeys.97 Likewise, the French organization dedicated to the protection of French geographical indications, L'Institut National des Appellations d'Origine (INAO), has also filed suit in a U.S. court attempting to prevent the use of a false French geographical indication. 98 The Cuban case presents, or at least should have presented, in the clearest manner the different approaches and rationales for protecting geographical
